The paper provides the axiomatic characterization of a new relative deprivation index. The concept of relative deprivation is here extended towards the inter-temporal framework. In fact, if we agree that deprivation is a relative concept, we should also believe that individuals not only take care of their relative position with respect to others, but also of their relative position with respect to their own past. While in the traditional relative deprivation framework the reference group is only other-regarding, in our work we stretch this idea and we also introduce a history-regarding reference group. The new index is illustrated with an application to EU countries.
Introduction
Deprivation has been always considered as an inter-personal concept: it is the feeling an individual experiences when she realizes to be worse-off than someone else in the society (Runciman (1966) and Stouffer et al. (1949) ). The term deprivation has been used in the literature in a somehow confusing manner. On one side, deprivation is considered as the number of functionings from which a person is excluded (see, for example, Chakravarty and D'Ambrosio (2006) ) or as lack of resources, in particular, employment, access to education, childcare, healthcare facilities, and social partecipation (Eurostat (2010) ), or lack of income (Subramanian and Majumdar (2002) and Chakraborty et al. (20008) ). On the other side, deprivation is used to denote the sense of difference, diversity, or depression, an individual feels by comparing her situation with the desidered one (Runciman (1966) , Bossert et al. (2007) , Chakravarty (2007) , Mukerjee (2001) , Yitzhaki (1979) ). We follow the latter approach, since the former concept is strictly related to and hardly separable from the idea of multidimensional poverty.
Going back to the overcited definition of deprivation by Runciman (1966) , we find out a neglected point: a person is relatively deprived when she realizes not to have something that other persons, "which may include himself at some previous or expected time", have (Runciman (1966) , p.9). Inspired by Runciman seminal work, we believe that deprivation is also inter-temporal, meaning that some individual's reference group is made not only by the other individuals, but also by her own history. Note that, even when time has been taken into account in the deprivation literature (Bossert et al. (2011) , Bossert et al. (2007) ), the reference group has been always other-related. In particular, when determining the deprivation of some individual, Bossert et al. (2011) stress the importance of taking into account, in a two periods framework, the number of individuals overtaking her. On the other hand, Bossert et al. (2007) bring time into the analysis to consider other-regarding deprivation in different times. In particular, they shift attention from deprivation to social exclusion when adding time to the analysis ("Social Exclusion" is "being in a state of deprivation over time" p.777).
We believe, instead, that time is in fact another dimension of deprivation, which can be explained as restricting some individual reference group to her own past. In this work, therefore, we embed the new concept of history-regarding deprivation: individuals are deprived not only because their outcomes are lower then someone else today, but also because their outcomes are lower than what it was used to be in the past. Each individual current outcome works as reference point which serves as zero point of the value scale. While in traditional relative deprivation framework, this zero point is used to evaluate the relative position only with respect to other individuals, in our work we stretch this idea and we also measure the deviations from that reference point to the individual previous period outcomes.
Therefore, the novelty of the paper is to look at the direction of individuals outcome path, defining as inter-temporal deprived those individuals whose condition is worsening over time. This idea of inter-temporal relative deprivation is strictly linked with the concept of mobility. Here we think of Fields (2007) concept of Directional Income Movements, "which gauges the extent of fluctuation in individuals incomes" when "the observer cares not only about the amounts of the income changes but also about their direction" (Fields, 2007, p.3) . In particular, we take into account only downward movements. In this sense, our index bridges two streams of the well-being literature: relative deprivation on one hand and mobility on the other. Also, introducing individual comparisons with her own history, the issue of how to discount past positions arises. In fact, when an individual compares her current situation with her past, memory plays an important role. We believe that an individual is less affected by a remote experience then a more recent one. We chose to evaluate income and time separately, allowing a more specific discussion of the role of time and the attitudes that individuals should take to it. Another novelty of the paper is to adapt what is usually stated by time-discounting analysis on future outcomes (Yi et al. (2006) ) to the past. Time-discounting results in valuing past outcomes less than the same level in the present or without discounting. The discounting factors will not be a-priori imposed, but axiomatically derived. There new ideas are embedded in the new individual iter-temporal relative deprivation index which is characterized by means of axioms in the first part of the paper.
Moreover, as in previous works (Bossert et al. (2007) or Bossert et al. (2011) ), we also take into account the persistence in the state of deprivation, by introducing the individual multi-inter-temporal relative deprivation index. This index additively aggregates some individual inter-temporal deprivations over her own past, and therefore depends on (i) comparisons with others today, (ii) comparisons with the individual own history, and (iii) comparisons with others in the past.
Finally, we aggregate the individual multi-inter-temporal measure to obtain an index which allows comparisons between different societies. We apply this new index to a selection of EU countries, stressing the information we can gain from our approach.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 provides the characterization of our individual intertemporal relative deprivation index, and contains the main result; Section 2 aggregates the individual deprivation over time to obtain a multi-inter-temporal relative deprivation index; Section 3 sum up the individual indices in an aggregate inter-temporal relative deprivation index; Section 4 presents the results of the empirical test of the index, based on EU-Silc longitudinal dataset. Appendices 1 and 2 contains the formal derivation of the indices described in Sections 2 and 3.
1 Individual inter-temporal relative deprivation
Framework
Consider a population N of individuals i = 1, 2, . . . , n, n ∈ N, and n ≥ 3 over a period of times T = (t, t − 1, . . . , t − τ, . . . , t − p) of length (p + 1), where t is today, τ = 0, 1, . . . , p represents the lag between today and the each past period, and p ∈ N is fixed and depends on the data availability or research purposes. Without loss of generality, let us consider n ≥ 3, and p ≥ 2.
We are interested in analyzing the inter-temporal relative deprivation of individual i at time t, with respect to some achievement level (for instance income, or consumption). Traditional measures of deprivation (Yitzhaki (1979) and Ebert and Moyes (2000) ) involve only achievement comparisons between individual i-th and other individuals j = i at a given point in time. We believe, instead, back to the original Ruciman's idea, that individuals compare themselves also with their own past achievements. In the following, we use notation x it to denote individual i-th achievement level at time t; X t is the vector of achievements of the entire population N at time t and X (i)t = X t − {x it } denotes the vector of achievement of all individuals other than i at time t. Moreover, X i is the vector of individual i-th achievements over the period of times T , and X i(t) = X i − {x it } denotes the vector of individual i-th past outcomes.
Individual i-th makes comparisons with her reference group R i . The reference group R i is made by two sub-sets:
O Other-regarding reference group and R i H History-regarding reference group. Note that traditional deprivation measurement (among the others, Yitzhaki (1979) , Paul (1991) , Ebert and Moyes (2000) ) involves only the other-regarding component, while here, in the spirit of the original Runciman (1966) 's work, we consider also the history-regarding one.
Deprivation arises on pair-wise comparisons between individual i-th and the generic k-th element in her reference group R i : we denote these comparisons by
denotes an other-regarding comparison. On the other hand, if k refers to individual i-th at some past time t − τ , δ ik = δ iτ (x it , x iτ , R i H ) denotes a history-regarding comparison. Comparisons δ ik could be any function that takes positive values if the outcome of the k-th element is greater than individual i − th's:
The available information can be summarized in the vector ∆ it = ∆ (i)t , ∆ i(t) . ∆ (i)t is the vector of length n − 1 of comparisons between individual i-th and all other individuals j ∈ R i O , while ∆ i(t) = [δ it−1 , . . . , δ t−τ , . . . , δ t−p ] is the vector of length p of comparisons between individual i-th and herself in past times (t − τ ) ∈ R i H . Characterizing the form of these income comparisons is beyond the scope of this paper; possible example are (i) xit) . Let us define D n+p as the class of all vectors ∆ it .
We denotes I it (∆ it ) : D (n+p) → R + as the inter-temporal relative deprivation of individual ith at time t. Aim of the first part of this work is to provide the axiomatic characterization of I it (∆ it ).
Note that our approach is different from other contributes that added time in the analysis of relative deprivation (Bossert et al. (2007) or Chakravarty and D'Ambrosio (2006) ) which we define multitemporal. In the multi-temporal approach to relative deprivation the reference group is always other-regarding. In our inter-temporal approach, instead, we bring time into the analysis in order to enlarge the reference group, by adding the other-regarding component.
Characterization
The first two axioms are merely technical conditions. Continuity states that if any comparison slightly changes, the index does not jump. While Normalization states that the index is lowerbounded at zero.
Deprivation is increasing in the comparisons between individual i-th current achievement and either (i) other individual current achievements or (ii) individual i-th past achievements, as stated in the following axiom.
The following axiom allows for individual comparisons to provide an independent contribution to the individual inter-temporal relative deprivation.
for some δ k = δ k , then,
for any θ ∈ R.
If deprivation arising from the vector of comparisons ∆ it is the same as deprivation arising from ∆ it , then by replacing the identical generic k-th element both in ∆ it and in ∆ it by θ, deprivation still remains the same.
Anonymity restricts the set of information needed to define some individual i-th inter-temporal relative deprivation. In particular, we impose that at time t only comparisons matter (and this is the traditional anonymity axiom as, for example in Ebert and Moyes (2000)). While, for history-regarding comparisons, information about the time-lag between the past and present, is relevant. Axiom 1.5 (Anonymity). Given any permutation π of N ,
This is a kind of symmetry applied only to individuals, not to times.
The next axiom states that only positive comparisons affect individual i-th deprivation. This means that some individual deprivation is affected only by achievements which are greater than hers. Axiom 1.6 (Focus). For any
Reference-group Replication states that, if we replicate ζ 1 -times the vector of comparisons with respect to others at time t and ζ 2 -times the vector of comparisons with respect to individual i-th own past, the individual deprivation remains unchanged. This axiom allows to compare individuals' reference groups (both other-regarding and history-regarding) of different cardinality.
Axiom 1.7 (Reference-group Replication). For any ζ 1 , ζ 2 ∈ N:
).
The above set of axioms leads to the following proposition. Proposition 1.1. An index of individual inter-temporal relative deprivation I it satisfies Continuity, Normalization, Monotonicity, Independence, Anonymity, Focus and Reference-group Replication, if and only if it is equal to:
where g, d and d τ are continuous, strictly increasing and such that g(0) = d(0) = d τ (0) = 0.
Proof. By Continuity, Monotonicity and Independence, from Theorem 5.5 in Fishburn (1970) it follows that
where g and d k are continuous and strictly increasing, and k = 1, 2, . . . , n + p. By Normalization, g(0) = d k (0) = 0. By Focus we can restrict the sum only to positive comparisons:
We can split the sum into the two components other-regarding and history-regarding:
By Reference-group replication:
By Shorrocks (1980) , this forces I it (∆ it ):
Without loss of generality, we choose ζ 1 = n and ζ 2 = p.
We here add a technical condition, in order for the index to be normalized between zero and one, which we label Averaging. For simplicity of exposition we can start from a reduced form of I it (∆ it ), which incorporates the results as in Proposition 1.1:
. We define D O as other-regarding deprivation and D H as history-regarding deprivation. Axiom 1.8 (Averaging). Averaging is obtained by imposing Traslativity and Homogeneity. For any F :
If both other-regarding deprivation and history-regarding deprivation increase, Translativity states that deprivation must increase by the same amount.
For instance, if both other-regarding derivation and history-regarding deprivation are doubled, deprivation must be doubled as well. 
where ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. By Aczél, 1966 (Theorem 1, pp.234-235) Traslativity and Homogeneity are satisfied if and
Parameter defines the relative importance of the history-regarding deprivation towards the otherregarding deprivation. For instance, if = 0.5, the index weights equally the two components; while by setting = 0 we boil down to the traditional definition of deprivation, where only the other-regarding component is valuable. For example, when = 0, equation (5) is a generalization of the Chakravarty index, Chakravarty, 1997).
Further refinements
In this section, we restrict the class of inter-temporal deprivation measures by imposing a second set of axioms. We concentrate on two issues: (i) the index sensitivity to transfers; and (ii) time discounting. Following Paul (1991) (and the subsequent works by Chakravarty and Chattopadhyay (1994) , Podder (1996) and Esposito (2010)), we impose that individual deprivation should be sensitive to transfers occurring between members of the reference group. In particular, Paul (1991) believes that an individual feels less envious with respect to an increase in the income of a rich person, than to an increase in income of someone close to him in the income distribution, where close means slightly richer.
In our inter-temporal framework, an achievement may be close to individual i-th under two points of view. The first, traditional, one: an achievement not too different than individual i-th's. The second, new, one: an achievement occurring in a period of time not too far in the past. We are concerned in the sensitivity of the index under both connotations. The first subsection (Sensivity) concerns the traditional idea of proximity, i.e. it regards being similar (or diverse) in terms of achievement levels. The second subsection (Time Discounting), instead, concerns the second idea of nearness, i.e. being recent (or remote) in terms of time.
Sensitivity
Let us first introduce some definitions. An Other-regarding regressing transfer is defined as a transfer from a smaller to a larger comparison with respect to others. Definition 1.1 (Other-regarding regressing transfer). For any δ k , δ j ∈ ∆ (i)t , such that δ k ≥ δ j ≥ 0 and for each ∈ R + , we say that ∆ (i)t is obtained from ∆ (i)t by means of other-regarding regressive transfer if δ h = δ h for each h = (k, j), δ k = δ k + , δ j = δ j − .
A History-regarding regressing transfer is defined as a transfer from a smaller to a larger comparison with respect to individual i−th own past. Definition 1.2 (History-regarding regressing transfer). For any δ k , δ j ∈ ∆ i(t) , such that δ k ≥ δ j ≥ 0 and for any ∈ R + , we say that ∆ i(t) is obtained from ∆ i(t) by means of history-regarding regressive transfer if δ h = δ h for each h = (k, j), δ k = δ k + , δ j = δ j − . Axiom 1.9 (Close (Far) Transfer Principle). Let ∆ (i)t obtained by ∆ (i)t by means of an otherregarding regressive transfer and ∆ i(t) obtained by ∆ i(t) by means of a history-regarding regressive transfer. Then:
The Far Transfer Principle states that the increase in individual i−th deprivation due to a marginal enlargement of a large comparison overcomes the decrease in individual i−th deprivation due to a symmetric marginal decrease of a small comparison. On the other hand, according to Close Transfer Principle the reverse happens: the decrease of a small comparison is strong enough to reduce individual i−th deprivation. Note that, Paul (1991) allows only for indexes that satisfy Close Transfer Principle, while we take a more general approach in a twofold way. First of all, we consider also transfers occurring in different past periods. Second and more important, we do not constrain a priori the researcher belief in evaluating marginal changes. If we assume Far Transfer Principle, individual i-th feels more deprived if she faces an increase in large comparisons. And these comparisons may be with respect to her own past or to other individuals today. A possible interpretation of the Far Transfer Principle is when the researcher believes that the wealthiest individual in the society, or the highest achievement someone has received in the past, acts as benchmarks toward which an individual aspires: moving further this threshold increases individual i-th feeling of deprivation. On the other hand (Close Transfer Principle), researchers may think that individual i-th is more affected by changes in achievements closer to hers. On the basis of this reasoning, it lays the idea that each individual compares herself with her alike and therefore that any achievement too much higher than individual i-th achievement today has a minor impact on her deprivation. Figure 1 shows how, the same regressive transfer of size (from δ j to δ k ) implies an overall decreasing effect on deprivation assuming the Close Transfer Principle and an overall increasing effect assuming Far Transfer Principle.
[ Figure 1 Proof. Close (Far) Transfer Principle is equivalent to assume that δjt>0 d(·) and δiτ >0 d τ (·) are Schur-concave (convex), see Kolm (1976) , p. 82. By Marshall and Olkin (Marshall and Olkin (1979) , theorem C.1.a., p.64) this condition is equivalent to d(·) and d τ (·) being strictly concave (convex), for each τ = 1, 2, . . . , p.
Time-Discounting
When individual i−th compares her current with her past positions, memory plays a major role, analogous to the one played by expectation for future outcomes in the traditional time-discounting analysis. We cannot believe that an individual is affected in the same way by comparing her current position with a recent past or with a remote experience. We believe, instead that the further in the past we look at, the less the individual deprivation is affected. The following set of axioms is inspired by Ok and Masatlioglu (2007) and al Nowaihi and Dhami (2006) and it concerns the characterization of the history-regarding deprivation. We adapt to our framework what is usually stated by time-discounting analysis on future outcomes. Recall that ∆ i(t) = [δ it−1 , . . . , δ t−τ , . . . , δ t−p ] is the vector of length p of comparisons between individual i-th and herself in past times. Axiom 1.10 (Memory Sensitivity). For any θ, δ iτ1 , δ iτ2 ∈ ∆ i(t) and for any τ 1 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p}, there exists a τ 2 ≥ τ 1 such that:
This axiom states that there always exists a period of time (t − τ 2 ) which is so far in the past that individual i−th position in such past period becomes irrelevant for the feeling of deprivation, regardless of the comparison level. In other words, we assume that the flow of time weakens the memories of the past experiences. Note that this axiom is similar to Impatience in al Nowaihi and Dhami (2006) and to Time sensitivity in Ok and Masatlioglu (2007) .
Example 1.1. Take two scenarios A and B, where A = [∆ (i)t , ∆ i(t) ] = [∆ (i)t , 10, 0, 0], and B = [∆ (i)t , ∆ i(t) ] = [∆ (i)t , 0, 0, 15]. Memory Sensitivity states that deprivation of the latter vector is not necessary higher than deprivation of the former one. In fact, even if in B individual i-th has experienced a higher past comparison than in A (15 versus 10), it is possible that her memory about 15 is weaker because is more remote than her memory about 10.
In other words, Memory Sensitivity states that, regardless of the size of the difference in current and past incomes, it is always possible to find a period which is so far in the past that such difference becomes irrelevant. The next axiom, instead, states that, regardless of how far in the past we look at, it is always possible to find an comparison level which is so high that it is still important in determining the feeling of deprivation. Axiom 1.11 (Comparison Sensitivity). For any θ, δ iτ1 ∈ ∆ i(t) and for any τ 1 , τ 2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p}, such that τ 1 ≤ τ 2 , there exist δ iτ2 , δ iτ2 = δ iτ1 , such that:
Even if the past period τ 2 is far enough so that the comparison δ iτ2 is negligible with respect to the comparison δ iτ1 occurring in a more recent past (as stated in Memory Sensitivity), we can find a comparison level so high (δ iτ2 ) that memories back to τ 2 are still strong enough to overcome δ iτ1 . . Comparison Sensitivity states that deprivation of the latter vector is not necessary higher than deprivation of the second one. In fact, even if in C individual i-th has experienced an higher comparison than in B (15 versus 10), it is possible that her memory about 15 is weaker because she experienced 15 in a more remote past than when she experienced 10. On the other hand, that past period which is far enough to forget a comparison equal to 15 is not far enough to forget about a comparison of 40.
The next axiom states that, if individual i-th is more deprived than individual j-th, then also individual k-th will be more deprived than individual j-th if individual k-th experiences a higher comparison level in a more recent past then individual i-th . Axiom 1.12 (Time-Comparison Monotonicity). For any θ, δ iτ1 , δ iτ2 , δ iτ3 ∈ ∆ i(t) and for any τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p}, if τ 2 ≤ τ 3 , and δ iτ2 ≥ δ iτ3 , then:
For sure deprivation stays higher if a higher comparison in a more recent past is recorded.
Axiom 1.13 (Time-Comparison Separability). For any δ i , δ i , δ i , δ i ∈ ∆ i(t) and for any τ
Consider the situation of having one element in the history-regarding reference group: δ iτ1 , which means that individual i-th experiences a comparison level δ i at time τ 1 . How much should δ i increase, in order for deprivation to be unchanged, if the past period when individual i−th was better-off is now τ 2 (further in the past than τ 1 )? We label the solution of this problem inflation factor of moving δ i from τ 1 to τ 2 . If the level of deprivation for having δ i at τ 1 is the same as having δ i at τ 2 , this means that δ i − δ i is the inflation factor of moving from τ 1 to τ 2 .
The axiom then states that if, starting from δ i , the inflation factor (δ i − δ i ) stays constant when moving from τ 1 to τ 2 and from τ 3 to τ 4 , and if the inflation factor of moving δ i from τ 1 to τ 2 is (δ i −δ i ), this inflation factor has to remain constant also for a movement from τ 3 to τ 4 . Therefore, Time-Comparison Separability states the independence between levels of comparisons and periods of time, and may become clearer looking at figure 2.
[ Figure 2 here] The last axiom is a technical condition that allows for a multiplicative relation between the relevance of comparisons and the relevance of time. Without Path-Independence, Time-Comparison Separability alone would impose an additive relation between the relevance of comparisons and the relevance of time. Path-Independence, instead, allows for a multiplicative structure. For a more detailed discussion, we refer to Ok and Masatlioglu (2007) . Axiom 1.14 (Path-Independence). For any δ i , δ i , δ i , δ i ∈ ∆ i(t) and for any τ 1 ≤ τ 2 ≤ τ 3 if
. . , δ iτ2 , . . . , θ, θ] = I it ∆ (i)t , θ, θ, θ, . . . , δ iτ3 , . . . , θ . Figure 3 gives a geometric intuition of Path-Independence.
[ Figure 3 here]
The following Proposition 1.4 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the deprivation index to satisfy the set of time-discounting axioms. 
where ω t (·) is decreasing with ω t (∞) = 0 and ω t (τ ) = 1/ω τ (t) and the function h mantains the same properties as d τ in Proposition 1.1 and Proposition 1.3
Proof. See Ok and Masatlioglu (2007) , theorem 1.
Proposition 1.4 allows for separating time and comparisons. Note that the history-regarding deprivation has been decomposed into two factors: ω t (τ ) which acts as discount factor and tells how the researchers disvalue the past comparisons; and h which is a function of comparisons.
Individual multi-inter-temporal relative deprivation
Recent literature about relative deprivation, as already mentioned, adds time into the analysis to consider other-regarding deprivation in different times (Bossert et al. (2011 ), Bossert et al. (2007 ). Even in our new inter-temporal framework, we cannot neglect that some individual relative deprivation at a given point in time is the result of the sense of deprivation she felt over all the previous periods.
In this section, therefore, we build the multi-temporal version of our inter-temporal relative deprivation index: the multi -inter-temporal relative deprivation index. Individual i-th multi-inter-temporal relative deprivation M iT will be a function of the inter-temporal relative deprivations that affected individual i-th over the period of times T = (t, t − 1, . . . , t − τ, . . . , t − p):
where I it−τ is individual i-th inter-temporal relative deprivation at time t − τ , τ = 0, 1, . . . , p.
Notice that this approach completes the concept of inter-temporal relative deprivation by considering the effect of past other-regarding deprivation on the current deprivation status. We characterize M iT by means of a traditional set of axioms, that we discuss in details in Appendix 1. In particular, we require the index to satisfy Continuity, Independence, Monotonicity, Time-span Proportionality and Transfer Principle. Independence provides the separable contribution of the inter-temporal deprivations (I it , I it−1 , . . . , I it−τ , . . . , I it−p ) on the overall multi-inter-temporal deprivation index. Time-span Proportionality states that multi-inter-temporal deprivation index does not change by replicating the time span (t, t − 1, t − 2, . . . , t − p) several times. Transfer principle imposes the index to put more weight to higher levels of inter-temporal deprivations. It is easy to prove that these axioms provide necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize the following class of multi-inter-temporal relative deprivation indices:
where f τ (·) is increasing and convex.
3 Aggregate multi-inter-temporal relative deprivation
The last step of the paper is to build an aggregate measure of deprivation which allows to make comparisons between different societies. The aggregate multi-inter-temporal relative deprivation index over the period T , A N will be a function of multi-inter-temporal relative deprivations M iT of all i = 1, 2, . . . , n individuals in population N . We proceed in the usual way by imposing few standard axioms which are formally discussed in Appendix 2. We assume that each individual multiinter-temporal deprivation M iT is independent (Independence), that individuals' names do not matter (Anonymity), that the aggregate index is an increasing function in individual deprivations (Monotonicity) and finally that the most deprived individuals weigh more in the overall deprivation (Transfer Principle). It is easy to prove these axioms provide necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize the following class of aggregate multi-inter-temporal relative deprivation indices:
where f (·) is increasing and convex.
An Empirical Test
The empirical test is based on EU- 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, for 25 EU member states (excluding Malta) plus Norway and Iceland. As outcome variable we choose the household equivalent disposable income using the modified OECD scale. We then deflate incomes using the harmonized consumer price indices provided by Eurostat (2010) , in order to have real incomes, comparable at time 2005, and we clean the dataset dropping all negative incomes. Given the class of indices as defined as in Equation (14), which we write here in extended form:
13 we choose the following functional specifications:
Parameter ∈ [0, 1] in equation (16) regulates the relative weight given to other-regarding and history-regarding deprivations. If = 0 index I it−τ boils down to a traditional other-regarding measure of deprivation and M iT will be an index of social exclusion as defined in Bossert et al. (2007) . The higher the value of , the larger the weight given to history-regarding deprivation in determining the overall deprivation status of some individual. If = 1 individual deprivation is only history-related. In the empirical application we present results for three possible values of = {0, 1 2 , 1}. Parameters φ, ψ ∈ R + controls for the individual inter-temporal deprivation index to satisfy Close Transfer Principle (if φ, ψ ∈ (0, 1)) or Far Transfer Principle (if φ, ψ > 1). Recall that in the first case we evaluate more the increase of smaller comparison levels while, in the second case, we give more weight to marginal increases in larger comparison levels. We impose φ = ψ = { 1 2 , 2}. Parameters ζ and η are chosen from Yi et al. (2006) as: ζ = 0.0006, and η = 1. Finally, parameters α and β are tasked to regulate the importance of the more deprived past periods or the more deprived individuals respectively, and in the application we set α = β = 2. Table 1 shows the values of different functional specification of the aggregate multi-inter-temporal relative deprivation index for a sample of european countries. A 1,2 AT 0.4872 0.0820 0.0112 0.0374 0.0065 0.0008 BE 0.5392 0.0801 0.0088 0.0328 0.0045 0.0004 ES 0.6165 0.1056 0.0141 0.0714 0.0129 0.0016 FR 0.5508 0.0830 0.0099 0.0318 0.0047 0.0007 IT 0.7734 0.1115 0.0110 0.0935 0.0125 0.0009 NO 0.6919 0.0946 0.0093 0.0676 0.0121 0.0017 PT 0.6382 0.0897 0.0089 0.0607 0.0064 0.0004 SE 0.5449 0.0689 0.0051 0.0249 0.0040 0.0006 Source: our elaboration on EU-Silc 2007 Longitudinal Dataset Table 2 shows instead the rank-position of each country for the different choices of the index' parameters, where 1 stands for the most deprived country and 8 for the least deprived. Sweden and Belgium are are among the least deprived countries according to any choice of parameters. Italy and Spain are, instead, always among the most deprived countries regardless of the specification of the parameters. Nevertheless, some differences appears: while Italy looks less deprived the more weight is given to the history-regarding deprivation ( = 1), Spain becomes more deprived when A 0, 1 deprivation may be extended towards the future, as in the seminal suggestion by Runciman (an individual reference group "may include himself at some previous or expected time", (Runciman (1966) , p.9). On the other hand, the traditional idea of other-regarding deprivation may be refined by means of weighting system that allows different subgroups to have a different impact on some individual relative deprivation.
Appendix 2: Characterization of the aggregate multi-intertemporal relative deprivation for any θ ∈ R + .
Axiom A2. 4 (Anonimity). Given any permutation π of N , A N (M N ) = A N (M π(1)T , M π(2)T , . . . , M π(i)T , . . . , M π(n)T ). Proposition 5.2. An index of aggregate multi-inter-temporal relative deprivation A N satisfies Continuity, Independence, Monotonicity, Anonimity, Population Proportionality and Transfer Principle if and only if it is equal to:
where f : R + → R + is increasing and convex.
Proof. By Continuity, Monotonicity and Independence from Theorem 5.5 in Fishburn (1970) , it follows that:
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where g and f i are continuous and strictly increasing for any i = 1, . . . , n. By Population Proportionality: A N (M N ) = A N (M N , . . . , M N ζtimes ) By Shorrocks (1980) this forces the index to become:
without loss of generality, we choose ζ = n and g −1 as the identity function. By Anonimity f i = f for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n. By Kolm (1976) and Marshall and Olkin (1979) , Tranfer Principle insures that f (·) is convex.
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Annex 1 On the vertical axes we measure time lags with respect to time t, such that τ 1 is a more recent past than τ 2 and so forth. On the horizontal axes we measure comparison levels. For instance, the point (δ i , τ 1 ) corresponds to individual i-th experiencing a comparison level δ i at time t − τ 1 . On the vertical axes we measure time lags with respect to time t, such that τ 1 is a more recent past than τ 2 and so forth. On the horizontal axes we measure comparison levels. For instance, the point (δ i , τ 1 ) corresponds to individual i-th experiencing a comparison level δ i at time t − τ 1 .
